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Student loan servicers play a critical and underappreciated role in federal student 
loan programs. The federal government contracts out to servicers an array of many 
of the most critical functions related to student loan repayment, including account 
management, payment processing, and the provision of information about payment 
plans and solutions for distressed borrowers. In fact, most borrowers’ interactions 
with federal student loan repayment are almost exclusively with their servicer. We 
aim to improve upon the scarce research literature about federal student loan 
servicers by exploring the complicated set of measures that determine how servicers 
are compensated for servicing each debtor and awarded portfolios for future 
business. The coverage and construction of these measures influence servicers’ 
behaviors by creating strong incentives that coincide to varying degrees with the 
goals of the government, public, student loan borrowers, and the servicers 
themselves. Understanding accountability and incentives in current and past 
contracts is critical as the U.S. Department of Education reforms servicer contracts 
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1. Introduction 
About 43 million debtors collectively owe more than $1.4 trillion in outstanding federal student 
loan debt in the United States as of 2019, an amount that is nearly three times the amount from 12 
years earlier (U.S. Department of Education, 2019). Delinquency rates on student loan debt have 
nearly doubled during the past decade nationally, and default rates on federal loan programs 
recently reached their highest level in more than 15 years (Lee et al., 2014; U.S. Department of 
Education, n.d.). Default and delinquency are costly for debtors, but also for the public; federal 
student loan debt is guaranteed, such that the public absorbs the costs of default. Student loan 
servicers (hereafter referred to as servicers) play a critical and underappreciated role in federal 
student loan programs; the federal government contracts out to servicers many of the most critical 
functions related to students’ loan repayments, including account management, payment 
processing, and the provision of information about payment plans and solutions for distressed 
borrowers. In fact, most borrowers’ interactions with federal student loan repayment are almost 
exclusively with their servicer. 
In response to growing concerns about servicer practices and efficiency, the U.S. 
Department of Education (ED) has frequently adjusted the regulatory context for servicers in 
recent years and has considered numerous drastic programmatic changes, including controversially 
proposing to move to a single servicer.1 Servicer oversight is ever more salient as practices by 
servicers of federally supported student loan debt have increasingly come under fire. For example, 
 
1 As part of the overarching agenda to reform student loan servicing, the U.S. Department of Education (ED) 
announced a plan to consolidate to one student loan servicer in May 2017. Under the plan, Federal Student Aid 
(FSA) would award one servicing contract, and the chosen servicer could then subcontract out servicing duties to 
other servicers. The ED argued that having one servicer could increase effective oversight and allow servicers to 
more efficiently service loans, with the ultimate goal of increasing repayment (U.S. Department of Education, May 
19, 2017). After political pushback proposing that having one servicer would place too much risk in the market, the 
proposed plan changed to having one portal for borrowers to find information on their loans and make payments. 
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high-profile lawsuits have been brought against some of the largest loan servicers: Navient and the 
Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency (PHEEA), including by the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and state attorneys general (e.g., Consumer Finance 
Protection Bureau, 2017; Cowley, 2017; Hillian, 2019; New York Attorney General, 2019). In 
addition to lawsuits, consumer complaints about student loan servicing have been prominently 
highlighted in media reports (e.g., Cowley, 2020; Friedman, 2019; Ortiz, 2019; Rosato, 2017).  
The ED has acknowledged limited oversight among its current contracts, asserting that 
“today’s loan servicing environment does not require maximum accountability. The legacy 
servicing contracts do not contain adequate incentives to reward servicers when they manage 
borrowers’ accounts successfully, and they do not allow for the appropriate consequences to be 
applied to loan servicers that fail to meet contract requirements” (U.S. Department of Education, 
2020). At the end of 2017, the ED announced the Next Gen Federal Student Aid initiative, which 
intends to alter the nature of how students and their families interact with the federal student aid 
system. A prominent aspect of this initiative is to reform servicer practices, contracts, and 
relationships, with its first set of contracts announced in June 2020. Understanding accountability 
and incentives in current and past contracts is critical as the ED reforms servicer contracts and 
responsibilities through its Next Gen initiative. 
In this paper, we aim to improve upon the scarce research literature about federal student 
loan servicers. The ED and federal agencies use a variety of accountability mechanisms to provide 
oversight to servicers, including performance and compliance monitoring, audits, and multiple 
avenues through which borrowers can lodge complaints. In this paper, we focus on a complicated 
set of implicit accountability measures that determine how servicers are compensated for servicing 
each debtor and awarded portfolios for future business. The coverage and construction of these 
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measures influence servicers’ behaviors by creating strong incentives that coincide to varying 
degrees with the goals of the government, program administrators, public, student loan borrowers, 
and the servicers themselves. We also add to the general knowledge of public sector contracting 
by empirically exploring whether the goals of servicers, borrowers, and the government conflict 
through this underexplored area. 
First, we describe the federal student loan servicing market from 2009 through 2019, a 
market that has undergone a drastic transformation as student loan borrowing increased 
substantially, the federal student loan program underwent a large structural change, and the 
government altered its process for awarding student loan servicing contracts. Next, we examine 
the implications of the ways that economic incentives in servicing contracts guide servicer 
behavior, using the lens of performance-based contract theory. The first incentive relates to a per-
borrower fee paid to servicers with penalties based on delinquency and loan status, which follows 
a linear contract model (e.g., Heinrich and Choi, 2007). The second incentive derives from how 
ED semiannually allocates new loans based on the servicers’ quarterly performance from the two 
quarters prior, akin to a multitournament contract (e.g., Gibbons and Roberts, 2013; Holmstrom, 
1982). To assess performance as part of this second measure, the ED uses a formula that is 
currently composed of three components with varying degrees of measurability: default 
prevention, borrower satisfaction, and federal personnel satisfaction. We examine performance on 
these metrics over time in relation to national student loan market trends and the relationship of 
the measures to each other, across servicers, and over time. While connecting servicer goals to 
public goals can improve performance, these goals may also be in competition with each other. 
We find repayment measures and borrower satisfaction empirically conflict with each other, which 
gives rise to concerns that increasing success in one may come at the expense of the other. Further, 
 4  
we simulate performance outcomes for servicers under different reweighting schemes that reflect 
different goal prioritization.  
Finally, we consider the extent to which consumer complaints registered against servicers 
are about terms and fees, handling payments, interactions with servicers and marketing, or account 
maintenance and information. We code over 16,000 complaints made about federal student loan 
servicers to the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (CFPB) from 2016 to 2019 and find that, 
over the time period, the share of complaints about interactions with servicers and terms and fees 
have dropped by about half, while the share of complaints related to maintenance and information 
has doubled.  
2. Federal Student Loan Servicers 
Federal student loan programs account for about 90 percent of the over $100 billion in student loan 
funds disbursed in recent years (Baum et al., 2018). Borrowers can access federal loan programs 
if they attend an eligible institution and if loan approval does not depend on borrower 
characteristics or expected default risk. Similarly, interest rates in federal student loan programs 
do not vary with expected default risk and typically have relatively favorable terms: Rates are 
subsidized, and some federal loan programs offer benefits such as the ability to postpone or reduce 
payments and/or interest accrual during times of college enrollment or hardship.  
Since 2009, the ED has directly funded federal student loan programs with servicing 
outsourced to nongovernmental contractors.2 Servicers play a critical and underappreciated role in 
the student loan process. Federal student loans are a relatively complex financial instrument that 
many borrowers will confront at a time when they may lack the knowledge and skills to evaluate. 
Evidence demonstrates that many students do not know how much they borrow, the terms of their 
 
2 Refer to Appendix F for a brief history of federal student loan programs. 
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loans, or their future repayment burdens, and more broadly, they are unfamiliar with college 
financial aid and the costs and benefits of college (Abraham et al., 2019; Akers & Chingos, 2014; 
Bleemer and Zafar, 2015; Darolia and Harper, 2018; Dynarski and Scott-Clayton, 2006). Upon 
entering college, borrowers must complete entrance student loan counseling mandated by the ED 
in order to borrow from federal programs, but it is generally considered ineffective (Fernandez, 
2016).  
Once students graduate, leave college, or drop below half-time enrollment, interaction with 
the borrower about student loan repayment largely transitions to the servicer, making the servicer 
the predominant entity with which most debtors will interface related to repayment. Servicers 
maintain borrower accounts, collect payments from borrowers, and process requests for deferment, 
forbearance, and forgiveness. They are also expected to serve as an informational resource to help 
borrowers navigate among complicated repayment options and solutions to difficulties repaying 
debt.3 Student loan debt repayment is unique in that it is not generally dischargeable in bankruptcy, 
adding potential burden to debtors who have difficulty repaying their debt and need relief (Darolia 
and Ritter, 2020).  
The modern incarnation of the servicer market started about a decade ago. We display the 
evolution of the market in Figure 1. Initially, ACS Educational Services/Xerox, serviced federal 
student loans starting in 2004 with a contract for the Common Services for Borrowers solution, 
including handling the operations of the Direct Loan Program loan portfolio (ACS, 2004; 
Campbell and Hillman, 2015; O’Flaherty and Battle, 2013). However, the ED through the 
 
3 For example, repayment plans can be confusing; students currently must choose among: “standard” repayment 
plans (which have fixed payments, typically over 10 years); “graduated” payment plans (in which payments increase 
on a schedule over the repayment period); “extended” payment plans (that extend the repayment period of standard 
or graduated plans for up to 25 years); and various income-based repayment plans that vary.   
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Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loans Act (ECASLA) of 2008 began buying back Federal 
Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) loans from holders to provide lenders with liquidity for 
new loans (Campbell and Hillman, 2015). To service the larger loan volume that would come with 
ending the FFEL program and this buyback (see Appendix F), the Federal Student Aid (FSA) 
issued a solicitation for servicers in 2008 under Title IV of Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) 
Part 12 (Campbell and Hillman, 2015; U.S. Department of Education, 2009).4 Servicers selected 
through this solicitation became known as Title IV Additional Servicers (TIVAS), depicted in blue 
bars in the figure. The initial servicers were FedLoan/PHEAA, Great Lakes, Nelnet, and Sallie 
Mae. In 2013, ACS’s servicing contract was not renewed (Hernandes, 2013). Sallie Mae spun off 
Navient Corporation in 2014 to become its government student loan servicer, with Sallie Mae 
servicing private student loans. In 2018, Great Lakes and Nelnet created a joint venture, GreatNet; 
however, each has continued servicing separately through the end of our analysis period (June 
2018), so we consider them separate entities throughout our analysis.  
In addition to the TIVAS, FSA also began contracting with not-for-profit servicers (NFPs) 
following the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act/Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility 
(HCERA/SAFRA) Act of 2010, depicted in green bars in the figure. In September 2011, FSA 
announced it planned to award servicing accounts to 15 NFP servicers, with accounts eventually 
awarded to 11 (O’Flaherty and Battle, 2013). When ACS’s contract was not renewed in 2013, FSA 
redistributed ACS’s Direct Loan accounts among the NFPs, as well as the TIVAS (Hernandes, 
2013; O’Flaherty and Battle, 2013). As a result, NFPs had loans that were more current and mature 
 
4 In the 2008 solicitation to servicers, applicants were evaluated based on the following criteria: (1) experience in 
processing at least 500,000 loan sale conversions annually and service at least 2,000,000 loans; (2) ability to process 
at least 500,000 more loan sale conversions annually and service at least 2,000,000 more loans; (3) willingness to 
improve offeror system; and (4) estimated costs to the government (U.S. Department of Education, 2009). 
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relative to TIVAS portfolios, making them more stable and less likely than the portfolios of TIVAS 
to become delinquent (Federal Student Aid, 2015). Last, NFPs began receiving new Direct Loans 
for the first time in 2015, collectively receiving 25% of the new loans from January 1 through 
August 30 (Hernandes, 2014). Since their original contracts, several NFPs stopped servicing 
federal loans and transferred loans to other servicers. The largest change among NFPs came in 
2013, when Kentucky Student Assistance (KSA) transferred its Direct Loan accounts to Aspire 
Servicing Center; EdManage, COSTEP, and EDGEucation transferred their accounts to Higher 
Education Loan Authority of the State of Missouri (MOHELA) (Hernandes, 2013). Aspire then 
transferred its accounts to MOHELA in 2015. Most recently, the Vermont Student Assistance 
Corporation (VSAC) cancelled its contract, and FSA transferred its accounts to Nelnet in August 
2016 (Brooks, 2016).  
The ED has shaped the market through its solicitation and selection process and through 
ongoing requirements. The initial TIVAS solicitation required potential servicers demonstrate 
experience in servicing 500,000 loans annually, process an additional 500,000 annually, and 
enhance servicing systems (U.S. Department of Education, 2009). These requirements created high 
entrance costs to the market. The NFP solicitation, while having a lower servicing threshold — 
the intent was for each NFP to initially service 100,000 borrower accounts with the potential for 
additional accounts based on performance — had 64 high-level servicer requirements, including 
developing interfaces connecting data across various organizations and programs and how to 
manage loans (U.S. Department of Education, 2010). Some NFPs, including COSTEP, 
EDGEucation, EdManage, and KSA, blamed high infrastructure costs and changing servicing 
systems for exiting the market (Hernandes, 2013).  
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As part of the Next Gen initiative, the ED intends to overhaul the way borrowers interact 
with servicers and the roles that servicers play. The reform was “driven by the experiences of 
federal student loan borrowers and is responsive to the need to establish a transparent and 
accountable system that allows for continuous improvement. FSA should continuously evaluate 
its servicing contracts to ensure that public resources are used efficiently and effectively to promote 
borrower success and protect taxpayers’ investments” (Mitchell, 2016). But the path to reform has 
been slow and riddled with legal and regulatory challenges, including changes in priorities 
following the transition from the Obama to Trump administration (DeVos, 2017), multiple 
cancelled solicitations, and lawsuits from private collection agencies and existing servicers (see 
Campbell, 2019, for an overview). In June 2020, the ED announced that it has signed a contract 
with five servicers for business process operations to directly engage with borrowers through 
contact centers and to provide back-office processing support, though these awards have also been 
subject to contention.5 Two other solicitations for “enhanced servicing solutions” and “optimal 
processing solutions” were cancelled, citing inability to reach agreement with vendors (Eidelman, 
2020). Because the ED is still in the process of converting to this system and many details of the 
contracts and responsibilities are still unknown, we focus on the servicing context prior to Next 
Gen.  
We display outstanding federal student loan dollars in repayment by each servicer in Figure 
2; we display a corollary figure for the number of borrowers in Appendix Figure A1. Outstanding 
loan debt data are not available for disaggregated NFPs, so we report them in aggregate. As of the 
second quarter (Q2) of 2018, the TIVAS serviced about 94% of outstanding federal student loans 
 
5 The companies are Edfinancial Services LLC; F.H. Cann and Associates, Inc.; MAXIMUS Federal Services Inc.; 
Missouri Higher Education Loan Authority (MOHELA); and Texas Guaranteed Student Loan Corporation (Trellis 
Company). 
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dollars in repayment, with PHEAA having the largest market share (34%), followed by Great 
Lakes (22%), Navient, (21%), and Nelnet (17%) (Federal Student Aid, 2018). The remaining 6% 
of loan debt is serviced by the NFPs.  
In Table 1, we show portfolios by servicer based on 2018 annual and Q1 2019 reports, 
including private and other loans. Three of four TIVAS also receive revenue from non-federal loan 
servicing, although at a much smaller magnitude compared with federal loan servicing. MOHELA 
services more in federal loan dollar and borrower volume than the other NFPs combined but still 
much less than any for-profit servicer.  
3. Compensation per Borrower Schedule 
Given the importance of servicers in collecting student loans and providing information to 
borrowers, the ED uses two primary economic mechanisms for guiding servicer practice. The first 
pays servicers a set per-borrower amount monthly that varies by the repayment status and 
classification of the borrower. For borrowers in repayment, payments are graduated based on a 
borrower’s delinquency, as shown in Figure 3, similar to a linear contract (e.g., Gibbons and 
Roberts, 2013; Heinrich and Choi, 2007). Consider profit for servicer j per borrower i in period t, 
Γ𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗: 
Γ𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 − 𝑃𝑃1𝑗𝑗�𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗� − 𝑃𝑃2𝑗𝑗�𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗� − 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗.    (1) 
For each borrower serviced, servicers obtain revenue equal to the base rate of compensation 
available to all servicers and set by the ED, 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗. 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 is discounted by a per-borrower rate, P1t, that is 
a function of the number of days a borrower is delinquent, 𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗, or a per-borrower rate, P2t, that 
varies by the classification of the borrower, Gjit. The servicer’s per-borrower servicing costs, 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗, 
are further subtracted from revenue. 
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Under the current formula, a servicer receives a base rate of $2.85 per borrower in 







0.00 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ≤ 5 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
0.74 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 6 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ≤ 30 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
1.39 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 31 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ≤ 90 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
1.50 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 91 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ≤ 150 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
1.62 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 151 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ≤ 270 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
2.40 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 > 270 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑.
    (2) 
In other words, there is no penalty if the borrower is current (i.e., they are servicing their 
obligations on time, a $0.74 penalty if the borrower is 6‒30 days delinquent, and up to a $2.40 
penalty for borrowers more than 270 days delinquent6). This lever directly correlates servicers’ 
revenue generation goals with the goal of default prevention as servicers earn higher revenue by 
keeping borrowers current. Penalizing servicers as delinquency days increase provides an 
incentive for revenue maximizing servicers to keep their borrowers current on payments. 
In a similar fashion, revenue per borrower is discounted by the classification of the 
borrower. Debtors who are actively servicing or expected to service their loan are considered in 
repayment. Alternatively a borrower can be in a grace period, which is typically a six-month 
period between separating from school and the time when payments begin; deferment, which is a 
granted temporary stop to payments for which interest may not accrue for certain loan programs; 
forbearance, which is a granted temporary stop to payments for which interest accrues; or still in 
 
6 Compensation changed in 2014 from the initial 2009 contract to increase the delinquency penalty. For example, 
from 2009 to 2013, the penalty associated with a severely delinquent account (i.e., > 270 days late) was 76% of the 
base rate of compensation, whereas currently the penalty is 84%. Moreover, the delinquency penalty previously did 
not begin until a borrower was more than 30 days late on payments, as opposed to the current five-day threshold. 
Historical rates are shown in Appendix B. 
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school. There is also a special category for service members that results in servicers being 







0.00 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅
0.00 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆
0.74 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑
1.17 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅
1.80 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅
1.80 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜
.    (3) 
Since borrowers in a grace period, deferment, forbearance, and in school are not actively repaying, 
they cannot be delinquent, and thus, P1t will always be equal to zero for these debtors. This then 
creates the incentive to keep a borrower actively in repayment, but it also provides an incentive 
for the servicer to help the student apply for a deferment or forbearance if the borrower is already 
or at risk of becoming severely delinquent. 
Such an incentive-based payment scheme implicitly assumes that servicers can affect 
debtors’ repayment status. In our model, a servicer can decrease delinquencies or move them to a 
different status by expending more to service the borrower, which can vary across servicers and 
borrowers. Factors outside of a servicer’s control can also affect repayment status and 
classification, following contract theory (Gibbons and Roberts, 2013). Thus, we can think of 
borrowers’ repayment status and classification as functions of borrower servicing costs, 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗, 
economic conditions affecting all borrowers in a period, θt, and idiosyncratic borrower 
characteristics, 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗: 
  𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝑖𝑖(𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , θ𝑗𝑗 , 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗)        (4a) 
 
7 According to the 2014 TIVAS contract, a servicer still receives full funding for delinquent service members, 
although servicers must document actions taken to prevent delinquency. A service member more than 300 days 
delinquent may be placed in forbearance by FSA to prevent the borrower from going to debt collection. 
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  𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝑖𝑖�𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , θ𝑗𝑗 , 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗�.        (4b) 
The per-borrower compensation system is likely to guide servicer behavior, and it 
potentially creates competition among a servicers’ goal to maximize revenue and goals of the 
government and borrowers, such as paying off the loan quickly or reducing the burden on 
borrowers. For example, a servicer has the incentive to keep borrowers current on their loans 
because they get higher compensation as the number of days of delinquency decrease. But a 
singular focus on delinquency may have negative consequences for debtor welfare; for example, 
consumer groups have sued Navient claiming that the firm makes excessive and aggressive calls 
to borrowers, while Navient claims that such calls can help borrowers avoid default (Ortiz, 2019).  
The compensation schedule also provides an incentive for servicers to prefer certain 
classifications over others. For example, a servicer receives a lower payment for a borrower in 
forbearance than for a borrower in repayment with up to 270 days of delinquency but a higher 
payment for forbearance than a borrower behind on payments greater than 270 days. Moreover, 
potentially differential costs associated with the various activities needed to service borrowers 
have the potential to drive behavior. For example, Navient and Great Lakes were accused of 
steering borrowers into forbearance because this action cost the servicer less than alternatives that 
might better improve borrower welfare (Congressional Research Service, 2019).  
Moreover, the compensation schedule provides incentives to servicers related to how long 
borrowers stay in repayment. Consider that total profit for servicer j in period t is the sum of profit 
from all individual borrowers serviced:  
 Γ𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = ∑ Γ𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1  ,         (5) 
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where the number of borrows in period t is all borrowers allocated to a servicer in prior periods, 
𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝜂𝜂, minus the borrowers who no longer have debt repayment responsibilities, 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝜏𝜏 , because they 
have paid off their loans or have had debt forgiven, for example: 
 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = ∑ (−𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗=−1 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝜂𝜂 − 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝜏𝜏).        (6) 
Servicer revenue declines as borrowers pay of their loans or have debt forgiven under the per-
borrower compensation schedule, and therefore, servicers have the incentive to maximize the 
number of borrowers who remain in their portfolios while keeping them current.  
4. Future Allocations 
The government’s second economic lever rewards performance by modifying allocations of 
awarded loan portfolios based on performance. This second lever incorporates some of the other 
goals that are not addressed by the per-borrower compensation schedule, such as borrower 
satisfaction. In Figure 4, we display the proportion of new borrowers allocated to each servicer 
(unlike the data on outstanding data portfolios, we have data on new allocations for each NFP). 
Servicers vary in their allocations, with PHEAA consistently receiving a small percentage of new 
allocations and Great Lakes and MOHELA receiving the largest. After quickly increasing through 
Q2 2015 from about 25% to 70%, NFPs as a group decreased in its share over time until 2018, 
with Great Lakes being the main beneficiary, although NFPs have begun increasing in its share in 
recent quarters. 
The ED awards future allocations following a multitournament framework where servicers 
are rewarded based on rankings over multiple points in time (Gibbons and Roberts, 2013). Each 
servicer earns points each period based on a set of metrics we describe next. Each servicer’s new 
allocations in a period are directly proportional to its share of points earned relative to total points 
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available in each period across all servicers.8 Servicers earn points based on a relative ranking 
within each metric, with the highest ranked servicer earnings points equal to the total number of 
servicers, the second best equal to the total number minus one, and so on (Federal Student Aid, 
2017). There have been nine servicers including both TIVAS and NFPs competing in the 
tournament since 2016, so in recent years, the top ranked servicer in a given measure would earn 
nine points, the second best would earn eight points, and so on, and the worst ranked servicer 
would earn one point.  
4.1. Measures used in Allocation Formula 
There are three general categories of metrics on which servicers are ranked, displayed in Table 2: 
repayment status (weighted at 60% of the total score), borrower satisfaction (35%), and federal 
personnel satisfaction (5%). The three general categories are further stratified, based on 
characteristics of borrowers, such as delinquency and years from graduation, described in more 
detail in the next section. Servicers receive points in each metric which are then weighted by 𝜔𝜔. 
We show weights in the far right column of Table 2.9 A servicer’s allocation can be increased by 
improving its rank in any metric, meaning servicers may then decide among goals to prioritize and 
 
8 Specifically, servicer j’s new allocations in period t, 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝜂𝜂, are directly proportional to its share of points earned each 












.   
  
The maximum and minimum shares of new borrowers a servicer can gain in a period are: 
𝑀𝑀𝑑𝑑𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 = 2
𝐽𝐽+1
   
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 = 2
𝐽𝐽(𝐽𝐽+1)
 .   
There have been nine servicers competing in the tournament since 2016, meaning that servicers can have at most 
20% of new allocations and 2% of new allocations at minimum. 
9 These metrics have been in effect since 2014. The metrics from pre-2014 are included in Appendix C. The four 
major changes were: (1) FSA made allocations semiannually instead of annually; (2) FSA no longer used school 
surveys; (3) the metrics related to repayment status/default prevention were changed; and (4) weights were changed. 
Through this, it redefined how it measured default prevention, while implicitly weighting certain goals. Borrower 
satisfaction and default prevention increased in relative importance, while federal and school satisfactions drastically 
decreased. 
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that the weights ED assigns to categories and metrics are likely to affect servicers’ investment in 
servicing borrowers in one category relative to others.  
First, consider the default prevention metrics, for which there are multiple components. A 
debtor in repayment can be in one of four mutually exclusive delinquency categories, based on 
their number of days delinquent, as determined at the end of each quarter (a debtor in default is 
not considered to be in repayment):10 
1. Not more than five days late on payments (ED calls this group Current); 
2. Payments 6‒90 days late (We deem this group as Minor delinquency); 
3. Payments 91‒270 days late (We deem this group as Moderate delinquency); 
4. Payments 271‒360 days late (We deem this group as Severe delinquency). 
Using these categories, the ED calculates three measures for each servicer: percent current 
( # 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗
# 𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗
), percent moderately delinquent (# 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅
# 𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗
), and percent severely 
delinquent (# 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅
# 𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗
). The proportion of the servicing pool with minor delinquency is 
not captured in the data but can be inferred as the remaining borrowers in repayment. ED follows 
the ranking steps for each of these three metrics within the repayment allocation ranking, where 
percent current receives the highest weight, 30% of the total, while moderate and severe 
delinquency are each weighted at 15% of the total.  
Borrowers have been further stratified within the repayment status measure into five 
segments since Q1 2016: (1) borrowers with at least one Consolidation or Parent PLUS loan; (2) 
 
10 From Navient’s 2014 contract: “For metrics I, 2, and 3 borrowers in school, in grace, in deferment, in forbearance, 
in Service Member, and over 360 days delinquent are excluded from both the numerator and denominator in the 
calculations. Calculations will be rounded to the hundredth of a percent. Borrowers with loans in multiple statuses 
shall be counted once, in the lowest performing deliverable status. The lowest performing deliverable status is 
defined as the lowest unit priced deliverable” (Navient, 2014).  
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borrowers who graduated within the past three years; (3) borrowers who graduated more than three 
years ago; (4) borrowers who did not graduate and left school within the past three years; and (5) 
borrowers who did not graduate and left school more than three years ago. The repayment metric 
is split into these five segments as the risk of delinquency varies by student characteristics and 
servicer portfolios differ in their makeup of students. For example, if a servicer had a high 
proportion of borrowers in a high-delinquency segment, it would seem to perform worse than 
others, on average, without special consideration. Further, segmenting borrowers increases the 
connection between servicers’ actions and repayment rates as more is within control by 
considering characteristics of the borrowers, reducing the influence on rankings of borrower 
characteristics (Rubenstein et al., 2003). Ranking servicers within each segment by repayment 
metric and quarter also help ensure that servicers are held accountable for actions within their 
control, without penalizing servicers for things like economic and labor market trends (Holmstrom, 
1982). We display weights for the stratified segments in Appendix C Table C1.  
 The second measure reflects borrowers’ subjective evaluations of their respective servicer 
and is weighted at 35%. The survey is based on the American Customer Satisfaction Index 
methodology, which is used to measure satisfaction in a variety of industries. According to 
documentation, scores can range from a minimum of zero to a maximum of 100, with a national 
average across all industries of 76.11 To try to make borrower surveys comparable across servicers, 
borrower satisfaction survey scores are calculated separately by loan status (in repayment and 
current, in repayment and delinquent, in grace period, and in school). In the survey, borrowers are 
asked questions related to customer service, quality of information, and ease of processes (Federal 
 
11 See, for example Federal Student Aid, (2015) and https://www.theacsi.org/. Additionally, the response rate is low, 
about 3% or 4% in 2017 (Office of Inspector General, 2019). 
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Student Aid, 2017). Borrowers likely value factors other than just being current on payments, 
including having access to flexible repayment options and servicer responsiveness; therefore, 
using the borrower survey provides incentives for servicers to meet these other goals. However, 
borrower goals are idiosyncratic and not fully known to servicers, reducing outcome measurability 
and possibly servicers’ ability to achieve high satisfaction even with proper incentives, particularly 
relative to repayment rates (Lu, 2015). Factors common to all servicers such as national attitudes 
toward loan servicing or student loan policies more generally could also influence borrower 
satisfaction, particularly as survey are not necessarily based on interactions with servicers. 
Last, the federal professional survey asks FSA staff about their satisfaction of each servicer 
from 0 to 100, where 100 is a perfect score. Questions are similar to the borrower survey as well 
as about the servicer’s data system, work products, information received, and general working 
relationship with the servicer (Office of Inspector General, 2019). Publicly available information 
on this measure is scarce, and this measure was downweighted from 20% to 5% when ED revised 
the allocation methodology in 2014. 
4.2. Trends in Performance on Measures used in Allocations 
In Figure 5, we show the national performance trend for measures used to allocate borrowers to 
servicers from Q3 2014 (the first quarter of the current incarnation of the allocation metrics) to Q2 
2018 (the end of our analysis period), with each servicer weighted based on its amount of loans 
outstanding as of 2018.12 First, consider the repayment rates in panel A. About 70% to 80% of 
borrowers in repayment are current, depicted in the solid red line, with a slight trend upward. This 
increase in current borrowers largely seems to have come from a decrease in the proportion of 
 
12 Information on the number of borrowers for each segment by servicer is not publicly available. After Q1 2016, we 
also weight repayment rate by the number of borrowers in each segment overall, described in detail in Appendix E. 
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borrowers with minor delinquency (6 to 90 days delinquent, dotted orange dashed line), as percent 
moderately (91‒270 days, green line) and severely (271‒360 days, blue long-dashed line) 
delinquent have remained relatively flat.13 
 We display current repayment trends by servicer in Figure 6 (we display trends in other 
measures of repayment status in Appendix Figure A3). First, in Figure 6, panel A, we show that 
TIVAS servicers have a growing proportion of borrowers that are current on payments over time. 
Great Lakes consistently has the highest rate of current repayment throughout the period, while 
rates of current repayment increased by more than 10 percentage points for Navient and Nelnet. 
NFP servicers’ current repayment rates shown in Figure 6, panel B, decreased notably until late 
2015, close to when FSA converted to rewarding performance for each segment of borrowers 
(recall that NFPs were originally assigned portfolios that were relatively mature and less likely to 
become delinquent). NFP servicers have trended upward since, converging and following a similar 
pattern with TIVAS servicers. While a bigger discrepancy existed for repayment rates between 
TIVAS and NFP before 2016, little exists now, although variation still exists across all servicers. 
Nationally, performance on the borrower survey, shown in Figure 5, panel B with a solid, 
purple line, declined 12% between Q2 2015 and Q3 2015, but stayed relatively flat thereafter. FSA 
stated the decrease was due to a change from live telephone interviews to online surveys distributed 
through email ― where respondents felt less social pressure to provide positive responses ― and 
 
13 Repayment rates differ by borrower segment, as shown in Appendix Figure A2. Although the percent of borrowers 
current has stayed mostly flat or increased slightly within each segment, a large discrepancy exists in repayment rates 
across segments, with borrowers leaving school without graduating in the past three years averaging about 30 
percentage points lower than borrowers graduating or with a consolidation for Parent PLUS loan in the top panel. The 
second panel shows the percent of borrowers severely delinquent. Borrowers more than three years removed from 
school severely delinquent have decreased since Q1 2016, whereas others have similar levels. While levels are 
different and percentage current has increased less than the rates reported by FSA quarterly reports, the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel data on percentage of borrowers in repayment that is current has 
also increased by 3.5% between 2014 and 2017. 
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similar in magnitude to decreases in other industry surveys when making the method change 
(Federal Student Aid, 2015). In Figure 7, panel A, we see that Great Lakes and Nelnet have 
received relatively high ratings from borrowers and decreased relatively less (2% and 7%, 
respectively) since Q3 2014. PHEAA’s and Navient’s ratings decreased about 12% and 15%, 
respectively, over the same period, with a notable dip around the time the survey collection method 
changed. NFP servicers saw a decrease in satisfaction in 2015, as shown in Figure 6, panel B, 
similar to the TIVAS, but are flat thereafter. 
Nationally, the federal personnel survey trend has slightly increased over time (Figure 5, 
panel B). Federal personnel surveys by servicer are displayed in Appendix Figure A4 and show 
most servicers have increased their scores since Q3 2014, though this measure exhibits greater 
variation from period to period for each servicer.  
5. Simulations Using Alternative Goal Weights 
To explore how the weights that reflect different goal prioritizations result in different types of 
allocations, we next perform two sets of simulations. First, we equally weight the five primary 
measures currently used (i.e., we weight percent current, percent moderately delinquent, percent 
severely delinquent, borrower survey, and federal personnel survey at 20 percent each). Second, 
we consider a scheme in which only one of the metrics is used (i.e., with a weight of 100 percent).14 
Whereas equal weights imply each goal has equal value, an extreme weight implies that the goal 
is the only one valued. As we show next, the differences among simulated results shows that FSA’s 
weights affect servicer loan portfolios. 
 
14 As described in Appendix E, for this exercise, we need to estimate the number of borrowers in each segment and 
delinquency status as these data are not publicly available. Using data on borrower type from FSA’s “Direct Loan 
Portfolio by Delinquency Status and Enrollment” documents (Federal Student Aid, 2018a), we divide borrowers into 
segments and repayment status and follow the ranking and weighting point system for allocating new loans 
described previously. The correlation between true and estimated allocations is about 98%. 
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We perform these reweighting scenarios for each quarter from Q1 2016 through Q2 2018, 
and then present the average across those quarters in Figure 8. First, consider panel A, with the 
current performance system on the left and the equal weighting simulation on the right. Each 
segment in the simulated allocation is the average new allocations based on a weighting system, 
with TIVAS servicers in shades of blue and NFPs in shades of green. Bars are capped at 100%, 
meaning each bar segment shows the average allocation for a given servicer under a given 
weighting scheme. Little change exists when comparing equal weight simulations to true 
allocations. Effectively, this is because the repayment measures have the same average weights 
(20% each) in the current system and the equal weighting simulation, so the main change is moving 
15 percentage points of weight from the borrower survey to the federal survey. As a servicer’s 
relative rank in both changed little over time (as shown in Figure 7 and Appendix Figure A4), this 
has little effect on the allocations. 
Simulations using extreme weights in panel B show larger changes in the allocations 
servicers would receive, especially when borrower and federal personnel survey rates are weighted 
more heavily than repayment rates. For example, if allocations were made solely on the basis of 
the borrower survey, the NFPs would receive a smaller share, about 55% of allocations, as 
compared with just over 60% in the current scheme or over 70% in a simulation in which only 
severe delinquency matters. The benefit associated with only using the borrower survey would 
largely benefit Great Lakes, Nelnet, and Granite State. On the other hand, Cornerstone and Navient 
would receive their smallest shares of allocations in a scenario that heavily values the borrower 
survey. Last, although a sole focus on the federal survey produces similar outcomes as the 
borrower survey for some servicers such as Great Lakes and Nelnet, it produces similar results as 
the present weighting scheme for others, most notably Navient. Overall, these simulations imply 
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what FSA values, and thus weights in determining allocations, can alter the revenue of servicers 
and their behavior.  
6. Relationships Among Measures Used in Allocations 
We next analyze how the three categories of measures used within the allocation formulas — 
default prevention, borrower satisfaction, and federal personnel satisfaction — relate to each other. 
We would not always expect for good servicer performance on one factor to correspond to higher 
performance on another factor, and, in fact, may be in conflict, as suggested by the simulations. 
For example, as previously mentioned, Navient claims that frequent contact with borrowers can 
help borrowers avoid default (Ortiz, 2019); however, “Keep getting calls about my loans” is a 
common complaint made against servicers (see discussion of complaints database in the following 
section). Thus, borrower satisfaction surveys and repayment rate measures may be negatively 
correlated.  
Consider the relationship between current repayment status and the borrower and federal 
surveys, as displayed in Figure 9. For simplicity, we use current repayment as our primary measure 
of the repayment status, plotted on the X-axis (we include corollary figures for moderate and severe 
delinquency in Appendix Figure A5). Each marker represents the relationship between the 
proportion current and either the borrower survey (circle marker, fit with a solid linear line) or 
federal personnel survey (diamond marker, fit with a dashed line) for each quarter from Q3 2014 
through Q2 2018 and weighted by servicer loan volume. Borrower satisfaction and proportion of 
borrowers who are current on their student loan repayment obligations have a negative 
relationship, suggesting that actions that bring borrowers current on their payments may not be 
appreciated by borrowers. The federal survey has a positive relationship with current repayment 
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status, suggesting an opposite relationship. Goals of federal personnel may then instead be more 
directly aligned with keeping borrowers current. 
In Appendix Figure A6, we see that these relationships still mostly hold among the TIVAS 
when broken out by servicer (panels A and B). However, NFPs mostly have a flat or slightly 
positive relationship between current repayment and the borrower survey and a flat or slightly 
negative relationship between repayment and the federal personnel survey (panels C and D). This 
could also be a function of NFP servicers having portfolios that include relatively more borrowers 
who are current on their payments.  
We next estimate repayment (percent of borrowers who are current in the top panel or 
severely delinquent in the bottom panel) as a function of borrower or federal survey score using 
linear regression and present results in Table 3. We include calendar quarter-year fixed effects to 
control for any unobserved characteristics affecting all servicers in each quarter, such as the 
national economy, and servicer fixed effects to account for any unobserved, time-invariant 
characteristics of servicers. We weight by the servicer’s share of total loan dollars outstanding.  
Results are consistent with Figure 9. On average, a servicer’s scoring a percentage point 
higher on the borrower survey is related to a decrease in share of borrowers who are current by 
about 0.61 to 0.67 percentage points in columns 1 and 3. The point estimate for the federal survey 
is positive, consistent with Figure 9, but not estimated with precision. These results provide further 
evidence for potentially conflicting default prevention and borrower satisfaction goals, in that on 
average a servicer does more poorly on its current repayment rate during periods when their 
borrower survey score is higher. 
7. Consumer Complaints 
To dig into the nature of borrower satisfaction, we next explore complaints made against servicers. 
We use complaints data from the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (CFPB), which maintains 
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a repository for complaints reported to the CFPB.15 To make a complaint on the CFPB website, a 
borrower checks boxes describing the product (e.g., federal student loan) and the type of problem 
and subissue (e.g., “Problem lowering your monthly payments”), while also naming the offending 
company. They are also given the opportunity to describe the issue through a narrative and provide 
a suggestion for a fair resolution. Such complaints and narratives are not verified by the CFPB 
before becoming publicly available, leading some to question their veracity (e.g., Delisle and West, 
2019); nonetheless, the complaints are informative since they are one of the public data elements 
that reflect borrowers’ dissatisfaction and can provide insight into borrowers’ perceptions and 
attitudes.  
From mid-2014 to July 2019, roughly 32,000 complaints about student loan servicing were 
registered in the CFPB repository. Prior to January 2016, borrowers were not asked to identify 
whether their complaints were related to federal, nonfederal, or private student loans. We therefore 
focus our analysis on complaints made about the TIVAS and NFPs related to federal student loan 
servicing between January 2016 and July 2019, which total roughly 16,500 complaints. The 
exercise is similar in spirit to the report by Delisle and West (2019), who considered a sample of 
1,200 complaints made under the federal loan servicing category. Asserting concerns that 
borrowers may mischaracterize their complaints, those authors ignore how borrowers themselves 
categorize complaints and use the lens of their staff and consultants to interpret borrower 
narratives. In our exercise, we instead consider roughly 16,500 student loan complaints made about 
the TIVAS and NFPs available in the database and rely on the borrowers’ own interpretation of 
their experiences. Because students may hold a combination of federal, non-federal, or private 
 
15 The CFPB was created in 2010 as part of the Dodd‒Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and 
exerts authority to oversee student loan servicers through its oversight of prominent participants in student loan 
markets.  
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student loans, but choose only one category under which to register grievances, and because 
evidence suggests that students sometimes do not fully understand the type of loan they hold (e.g., 
Darolia and Harper, 2018), we also conduct supplementary analysis of complaints made about all 
types of loan servicing (federal, nonfederal, and private). Conclusions are similar when we use the 
full sample of all as when we restrict to just federal loans, as shown in Appendix Figures A7 and 
A8. 
In Figure 10, panel A, we plot the trends over time in total complaints and total complaints 
per million borrowers in repayment by quarter for all servicers. Most quarters have about 600 to 
1,500 complaints and 200 to 400 complaints per million borrowers, with a slight trend upward. 
There is a large spike in the first quarter of 2017, coinciding with several state attorney generals’ 
suing Navient. We proffer no opinion here about the merits of the lawsuits, but instead consider if 
they highlighted complaints about Navient that could have influenced borrowers’ and 
policymakers’ perceptions. Navient had by far the largest percentage of complaints in the CFPB 
database and accounts for about half of all complaints. In panel B of Figure 10, we split out Navient 
and PHEAA from the rest of the servicers as the two servicers with the most complaints over the 
time period (about 8,000 or half of all complaints and 2,500 or one-eighth of all complaints, 
respectively). Navient’s complaints per million borrowers increased over 1,500% during early 
2017 lawsuits, though it is unclear if the underlying dissatisfaction was in response to or a 
precursor to the high-profile lawsuits brought against the company. PHEAA’s complaints patterns 
slightly increased during the time period and spiked (about a 100% increase) correspondent to 
prominent legal actions against them, such as that brought by the Attorney General of 
Massachusetts in 2017 (Cowley, 2017), though at a much smaller magnitude compared with the 
 25  
complaints related to Navient. Other servicers, in total, did not see much change in the rate of 
complaints around the time of the Navient spike.  
We next explore to which aspects of borrowing complaints relate to each other. Recent 
lawsuits demonstrate borrowers’ dissatisfaction related to things like harassing calls, being 
unknowingly moved into forbearance, frustration with inability to get loans forgiven, and 
inflexibility in payment options. However, the context around student loan repayment is 
complicated, and responsibility for various aspects of dissatisfaction may be distributed among 
parties beyond the servicer. For example, debtors might be dissatisfied with their loan repayment 
experience if they do not believe that their education was “worth it,” even though this is likely to 
be largely a function of their educational and labor market experiences. Alternatively, a debtor 
might be unhappy with their interest rate, which are largely determined by the federal government. 
Servicers are the main point of contact for borrowers in repayment and thus may be the target of 
borrowers’ ire, regardless of the servicers’ power to remediate the specific grievance. Coding 
complaints by issue category provides insight into borrowers’ perceptions and dissatisfaction with 
various aspects of the student loan experience, beyond just actions by the servicer. 
We code each complaint as one of four categories: terms and fees; payment handling; 
marketing practices and interactions with servicers; and account maintenance and information (see 
Appendix D for details). For example, we consider a complaint to be related to handling payments 
when a debtor says they have “Trouble with how payments are handled” or “Can’t get flexible 
payment options for repaying your loan.” Examples of subissues we code as related to interactions 
with servicers when they “Keep getting calls about my/your loans” and “Problem with customer 
service.” When students say that they “Received bad information about my/your loan” or “Need 
information about my/your loan balance/terms,” we code these subissues as related to account 
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maintenance and information. Finally, complaints about terms and fees include subissues like 
“Don’t agree with fees charged” and “Problem with the interest rate.” We also reviewed the 
complaint narratives to inform our classification process and provide the full list of subissues and 
some illustrative examples of narratives in Appendix D.  
We see in Figure 11 that the share of complaints related to maintenance and information is 
growing over time. About 20% of complaints were about account maintenance and information in 
Q1 2016; this share rose to over 40% by Q2 2019. Meanwhile, complaints related to handling 
payments initially increased from 43% to 55% from Q1 2016 through Q1 2017 but has since 
decreased back to close to 40%. Last, the share of complaints about interactions with servicers or 
marketing dropped from 20% to 10% around Q1 201, and share about terms and fees has fallen 
from 12% to about 6% over the timespan.  
These trends suggest that borrowers may be less satisfied, particularly with aspects of 
borrowing related to account maintenance and information, such as receiving information about 
their loans. In terms of economic incentives, FSA does not directly consider CFPB complaints in 
how servicers are compensated or allocated new loans. It is possible that the concerns underlying 
the complaints database are reflected in the borrow survey; however, the shift in CFPB complaint 
categories does not seem to relate to the borrower survey overall ratings which have been relatively 
constant in recent years (see Figure 5, panel B, and Figure 7).  
8. Discussion 
Given their importance in collecting on and helping borrowers repay over $1 trillion in student 
loans, the economic incentives inherent in its government contracts can guide servicers’ behavior 
and influence their success in achieving goals of the government, borrowers, and the public. 
Servicers are compensated per borrower based largely on repayment status, which prioritizes 
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default management above other goals such as borrower satisfaction. In recognizing the limitations 
in solely using a compensation per borrower schedule, the ED established a multifaceted set of 
goals for distributing new loans based on past performance, reflecting a multitournament format. 
Ranking servicers helps eliminate factors common to all servicers, such as a poor economy or 
changes to federal policy. Segmenting borrowers based on their characteristics for repayment 
metrics also helps further remove factors out of servicers’ control such as whether the student 
graduated and age of the loan.  
Public goals related to servicer practice, specifically repayment and borrower satisfaction, 
empirically conflict with each other, meaning increasing success in one may come at the expense 
of the other. For example, decreasing calls to borrowers may increase satisfaction but reduce 
repayment at the margin. This highlights how incentives in contracts, in this case, both what is 
included in relevant formulas and the weights assigned to them, can guide outcomes.  
As servicers’ actions to improve repayment appear to be negatively related to borrower 
satisfaction, we explored how complaints against servicers, a signal of dissatisfaction, relate to 
aspects of borrowing. It is possible that borrowers may target their dissatisfaction with student loan 
repayment experiences toward servicers because the servicer is with whom borrowers primarily 
interact no matter the issue. Over time, a larger share of complaints relates to account maintenance 
and information at the expense of other aspects like marketing, interactions, terms and fees, and 
payment handling. 
As the ED moves toward its Next Gen servicing environment, many of the accountability 
structures and incentives inherent in existing contracts will change, but lessons from the current 
system can provide important insight. If different firms have control over only selected aspects of 
the servicing process ― as opposed to one servicer largely overseeing the total experience under 
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the current model ― this will likely make it more difficult to pinpoint who should be held 
accountable for the overall repayment outcomes and the satisfaction of borrowers, postsecondary 
institutions, and aid professionals. This is likely to lead borrowers to focus their discontent largely 
at the ED and FSA and away from any single servicer.  
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Figure 1: Student Loan Servicers over Time 
 
 
Notes: Timeline shows contracts for servicing federal student loans as of 2009. Dates are based on contracts 
published in the FSA data center and announcements. Great Lakes and Nelnet announced a merger in 2018 to 
become GreatNet; however, we consider them separately here since FSA measured performance and new loan 
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Figure 2: Loan Dollars Outstanding by Servicer 
 
Notes: Data come from Federal Student Aid quarterly reports on servicer portfolio by loan status (Federal Student 
Aid, 2018a). Loans in repayment are actively in repayment status and fewer than 361 days delinquent. Dollars 
outstanding include both principal and interest accumulated. 
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Notes: Figure shows monthly compensation in dollars per borrower for servicers based on most recent rates published 
in the TIVAS 2014 contract (Navient, 2014). 
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Figure 4: Proportion of New Borrower Allocations by Servicer 
 
 
Notes: New allocation amounts by servicer are the number of borrowers allocated to each servicer semiannually 
from FSA allocation reports. Data begin in the 4th quarter 2014 and are from Federal Student Aid quarterly servicer 
performance and allocations reports (Federal Student Aid, 2017). TIVAS servicers are shades of blue and NFP 
servicers shades of green. 
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Figure 5: Trends in Servicer Performance, Repayment Rates 
  
(A) Repayment Rates, National 
 
(B) Surveys, National 
 
Notes: Data come from Federal Student Aid quarterly servicer performance and allocations reports (Federal Student 
Aid, 2017). Observations are by quarter and weighted by servicer by federal loans serviced as of 2018 shown in 
Table 1. Data begin in 2nd quarter 2014. 
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Notes: Data come from Federal Student Aid quarterly servicer performance and allocations reports (Federal Student 
Aid, 2017) and begin in 3rd quarter 2014. Graphs show trends in percent of borrowers in repayment that are fewer 
than six days delinquent by servicer. 
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Notes: Data come from Federal Student Aid quarterly servicer performance and allocations reports (Federal Student 
Aid, 2017) and begin in 3rd quarter 2014. Graphs show trends in borrower survey score by servicer. 
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Figure 8: Weighting Simulations 
 
(A) Current Allocation and Equal Weight Simulation 
 
 (B) Sole Weight Simulation 
 
Notes: Data come from Federal Student Aid quarterly servicer performance and allocations reports (Federal Student 
Aid, 2017), split by servicer, beginning in 1st quarter 2016 through Q2 2018. Allocations are simulated based on 
changing metric weights while using true performances by metric. In panel A, “Equal weights” gives each metric a 
20% weight. In panel B, each bar shows the average new allocation by servicer if the metric weight were 100%. 
Servicer allocations within each bar are the average allocation for the servicer over the time period.  
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Notes: Data come from Federal Student Aid quarterly servicer performance and allocations reports (Federal Student 
Aid, 2017). Observations are by quarter beginning in 3rd quarter 2014 and weighted by servicer by federal loans 
serviced as of 2018 shown in Table 1. The graph shows correlations between percent of borrowers in repayment that 
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(B) Navient Separate from Other Servicers 
 
Notes: Data come from the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau complaint database, starting from March 2016 
through June 2018. Vertical red lines are lawsuits filed by state attorney generals against Navient in January and 
October 2017, respectively. Complaints only include those with a subproduct of federal student loan. 
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Figure 11: Trends in Complaint Category Shares 
 
Notes: Data come from the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau complaint database, starting from January 2016 
through July 2019. Figure shows trends by quarter of percent of complaints for all servicers by terms and fees, 
handling payments, interactions with servicers and marketing, or account maintenance and information. Complaints 
only include those with a subproduct of federal student loan. 
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Table 1: Servicers’ Student Loan Portfolios 2018/2019 
 
 Federal Student Loans Serviced Non-Federal Student Loans Serviced 
 # (millions) $ (billions) # (millions) $ (billions) 
TIVAS     
PHEAA+ -- 394.8 -- 56.7 
Navient 5.90 293.0 -- 22.1 
Great Lakes 7.40 237.1 N/A N/A 
Nelnet 7.36 219.0 0.7 16.1 
     
NFPs     
MOHELA+* 2.00 37.6 -- 15.7 
HESC+* 0.90 8.6 N/A N/A 
OSLA+* 0.55 7.1 -- -- 
Cornerstone  0.31 1.5 N/A N/A 
Granite State  0.02 0.2 N/A N/A 
Notes: Data are from March 2019 quarterly or 2018 annual reports and show average amounts over the quarter or 
year. N/A indicates the given NFP did not servicer non-Federal student loans. + “—” indicates data could not be 
found for the field within the quarterly or annual reports. 
 
  
 45  
Table 2: Allocation Measures, 2016‒present 
 
Category Category Weight Metric Metric Weight 
Repayment Status 60% 
% Current 30% 
% 91-270 Days 
Delinquent 15% 
% 271-360 Days 
Delinquent 15% 
Borrower Satisfaction 35% n/a n/a 
Federal Personnel 
Satisfaction 5% n/a n/a 
 
Notes: Metrics and weights come from Federal Student Aid’s “Explanation of Allocation and Performance Measure 
Methodology” (Federal Student Aid, 2015). 
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Table 3: Estimates of Repayment Metrics 
Panel A. Percent Current 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Borrower Survey -0.67***  -0.61*** 
 (0.10)  (0.06) 
    
Federal Survey  0.30 0.16 
  (0.17) (0.09) 
    
Observations 117 117 117 
Panel B. Percent Severely Delinquent 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Borrower Survey -0.00  0.00 
 (0.02)  (0.01) 
    
Federal Survey  0.01 0.01 
  (0.02) (0.01) 
    
Observations 112 112 112 
Servicer Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
Notes: Data come from Federal Student Aid quarterly servicer performance and allocations reports (Federal Student 
Aid, 2017). Data are for Q3 2014 through Q2 2018. Unit of observation is servicer-by-quarter. Percent Current is 
percent of borrowers fewer than six days delinquent. Percent Severely Delinquent is percent of borrowers 271‒360 
days delinquent. Borrower and federal surveys are on a scale of 0 to 1. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
All metrics are weighted by the servicer’s share of total loan dollars outstanding. Servicer and quarter-year fixed 
effects included in all models. Panel B has five fewer observations as the NFPs did not have a severely delinquent 
reported for the first quarter. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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APPENDIX A: Additional Tables and Figures 
 
Appendix Figure A1: Borrowers in Repayment by Servicer 
 
 
Notes: Data come from Federal Student Aid quarterly reports on servicer portfolio by loan status (Federal Student 
Aid, 2018a). Borrowers in repayment are current or fewer than 361 days delinquent. 
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Appendix Figure A2: Trends in Repayment Status, by Segment 
(A) Current Repayment 
 
(B) % Moderately Delinquent 
 
(C) % Severely Delinquent 
 
Notes: Data come from Federal Student Aid quarterly servicer performance and allocations reports (Federal Student 
Aid, 2017) and are weighted by servicer by federal loans serviced as of 2018 shown in Table 1. Data begin in 1st 
quarter 2016, the first quarter metrics were subdivided by segment. 
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Appendix Figure A3: Trends in Delinquency by Servicer, 2014‒2018 
 
(A) % Moderately delinquent, TIVAS 
 
(B) % Severely delinquent, TIVAS 
 
 
 (C) % Moderately delinquent, NFP 
 
(D) % Severely delinquent, NFP 
 
 
Notes: Data come from Federal Student Aid quarterly servicer performance and allocations reports (Federal Student 
Aid, 2017) and begin in 3rd quarter 2014. Graphs show trends in percent of borrowers in repayment who are 
moderately and severely delinquent. 
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Appendix Figure A4: Trends in Federal Survey by Servicer, 2014‒2018 
 
 









Notes: Data come from Federal Student Aid quarterly servicer performance and allocations reports (Federal Student 
Aid, 2017) and begin in 3rd quarter 2014. Graphs show trends in federal personnel survey score by servicer. 
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Appendix Figure A5: Relationship Between Delinquency and Surveys 
 
(A) Moderate Delinquency/Borrower & Federal Surveys 
 
(B) Severe Delinquency/Borrower and Federal Surveys 
 
 
Notes: Data come from Federal Student Aid quarterly servicer performance and allocations reports (Federal Student 
Aid, 2017) beginning in 3rd quarter 2014 and are weighted by servicer by federal loans serviced as of 2018 shown in 
Table 1. The graph shows correlations between percent of borrowers in repayment that are fewer than six days 
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Appendix Figure A6: Relationship Between Metrics, by Servicer 
 
(A) Current/Borrower Survey, TIVAS 
 
 




(C) Current/Borrower Survey, NFP 
 
 




Notes: Data come from Federal Student Aid quarterly servicer performance and allocations reports (Federal Student 
Aid, 2017), split by servicer, by quarter beginning in 3rd quarter 2014. The graphs show correlations between 
percent of borrowers in repayment that are fewer than six days delinquent and borrower survey and federal 
personnel survey scores. 
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(B) Navient Separate from Other Servicers 
 
Notes: Data come from the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau complaint database, starting from September 2014 
through June 2018. Vertical red lines are lawsuits filed by state attorney generals against Navient in January and 
October 2017, respectively. Complaints include those with a subproduct of federal, non-federal, or private loan. 
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Appendix Figure A8: Trends in Complaint Category Shares ― All Student Loan 
Complaints 
 
Notes: Data come from the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau complaint database, starting from September 2014 
through July 2019. Figure shows trends by quarter of percent of complaints for all servicers by terms and fees, 
handling payments, interactions with servicers and marketing, or account maintenance and information. Complaints 
include those with a subproduct of federal, non-federal, or private loan. 
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APPENDIX B: Historical Servicer Compensation per Borrower  
 









Borrowers in In-school Status N/A N/A 1.05 
Borrowers in Grace or Current Repayment Status 1 3,000,000 2.11 
 3,000,001 UP 1.90 
Borrowers in Deferment or Forbearance 1 1,600,000 2.07 
 1,600,001 UP 1.73 
Borrowers 31-90 Days Delinquent N/A N/A 1.62 
Borrowers 91-150 Days Delinquent N/A N/A 1.50 
Borrowers 151-270 Days Delinquent N/A N/A 1.37 
Borrowers 270+ Days Delinquent N/A N/A 0.50 
Note: From Sallie Mae 2009 contract.  
 
(B) Compensation Rates from Example Original NFP Contract ― 2011 
 
For first 100,000 allocated borrower accounts only, the following pricing shall apply: 
Category Unit Price Min. Order Max. Order 
Borrowers in In-school Status $1.15 1 10 million 
Borrowers in Grace or Current Repayment 
Status 
$2.32 1 10 million 
Borrowers in Deferment or Forbearance $2.28 1 10 million 
Borrowers 31-90 Days Delinquent $1.78 1 10 million 
Borrowers 91-150 Days Delinquent $1.65 1 10 million 
Borrowers 151-270 Days Delinquent $1.51 1 10 million 
Borrowers 270+ Days Delinquent $0.55 1 10 million 
On-System Conversion Fees (Per Borrower 
Account)* 
$10,000 1 10 million 
Incurred Start-Up Costs (per Entity)** Up to $300,000 1 10 million 
 
*Applies to the first 100,000 borrower accounts each entity loads onto its system for servicing. Billable only after 
actual conversion of accounts has occurred. No costs for off-system conversions/transfers shall apply. 
 
**Reimbursable ceiling amount for actual, reasonable, allowable, and allocable costs incurred in meeting the 
Government’s stated requirements, in accordance with FAR 31.201. All costs under this category shall be subject to 
audit and are only reimbursable after contract award. 
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Unit Price Min. 
Order 
Max. Order 
Borrowers in In-school Status N/A N/A $1.05 1 10 million 
Borrowers in Grace or Current 
Repayment Status 
1 3,000,000 $2.11 1 10 million 
 3,000,001 UP $1.90 1 10 million 
Borrowers in Deferment or 
Forbearance 
1 1,600,000 $2.07 1 10 million 
 1,600,001 UP $1.73 1 10 million 
Borrowers 31-90 Days Delinquent N/A N/A $1.62 1 10 million 
Borrowers 91-150 Days Delinquent N/A N/A $1.50 1 10 million 
Borrowers 151-270 Days Delinquent N/A N/A 1.37 1 10 million 
Borrowers 270+ Days Delinquent N/A N/A 0.50 1 10 million 
Note: From MOHELA 2011 Contract.  
 
(C) Compensation Rates from Example Current Servicing Contracts ― 2014 
 
Note: From Navient 2014 contract.   
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APPENDIX C: Allocation Measures and Weights 
 
Table C1: Further Detail on Allocation Measures & Weights, 2016‒present  
 




Repayment Status 60% 
% Current 30% 
Consolidation/ 
Parent PLUS loan 
holders 
4.28% 
Graduated ≤ 3 
years 8.57% 
Graduated > 3 
years 8.57% 
Did not Graduate, 
Left school ≤ 3 
years 
4.30% 
Did not Graduate, 
Left school > 3 
years 
4.30% 
% 91-270 Days 
Delinquent 15% 
Consolidation/ 
Parent PLUS loan 
holders 
2.14% 
Graduated ≤ 3 
years 2.70% 
Graduated > 3 
years 2.70% 
Did not Graduate, 
Left school ≤ 3 
years 
3.73% 
Did not Graduate, 
Left school > 3 
years 
3.73% 
% 271-360 Days 
Delinquent 15% 
Consolidation/ 
Parent PLUS loan 
holders 
2.14% 
Graduated ≤ 3 
years 2.46% 
Graduated > 3 
years 2.46% 
Did not Graduate, 
Left school ≤ 3 
years 
3.97% 
Did not Graduate, 




Satisfaction 35% Borrower Survey 
 In School 8.75% 







Survey of FSA 
Personnel 
 N/A 5% 
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To create the weights 𝜔𝜔𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗 in the previous table, servicer performance is first weighted by 
the number of borrowers in repayment of that segment, w, such as graduated in past three years 
and current, across all servicers, j, (𝑊𝑊𝛷𝛷𝑗𝑗𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗 = 𝛷𝛷𝑗𝑗𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗 ∗
𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗
𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗
). FSA next multiplies the weighted points 




� ) for each 
segment, which is percent of borrowers delinquent in that segment relative to the overall 
delinquency rate, making segments with a high delinquency rate given more points. As allocations 
are determined semiannually, but performance is measured quarterly, delinquency-adjusted points 
are then averaged across the two quarters. For each of the three delinquency metrics, percent 
current, percent 91‒270 days delinquent, and percent 271‒360 days delinquent, servicers are then 
ranked from highest to lowest based on average delinquency adjusted points across each segment 
in that state, with the best again receiving 𝛷𝛷 points, the second best 𝛷𝛷-1 points, and so on, where 
𝛷𝛷 is the number of servicers. Last, a servicer’s points are multiplied by that state’s weight (30%, 
15%, and 15% for current, moderately delinquent, and severely delinquent, respectively). 𝜔𝜔𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗 
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Table C2: Historical Allocation Metrics 
 
 
Original TIVAS Allocation Weights  
(2010‒2014) 
Current Servicer Allocation Weights 
(2014‒2019) 
Category 
Weight Metric Segment Weight 
Category 






































In School 6.67% 
35% Borrower Survey 
In School 8.75% 
In Grace 6.67% 






























Notes: Metrics and weights come from Federal Student Aid’s “Explanation of Allocation and Performance Measure 
Methodology” (Federal Student Aid, 2015). Subparts for the “repayment status” goal are weighted based on 
percentage of all borrowers in repayment in that segment, and the segment’s delinquency rate. Given these changes 
over time, subpart weights change over time and are not shown. Weights for repayment status subparts are based on 
estimates described in detail in Appendix E.  
 
 
Until Q3 2014, FSA awarded servicers new portfolios each July based on average quarterly 
performance of the year prior, similar to the current system although different metrics. There were 
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four main categories, detailed in Table C2: repayment status/default prevention, borrower 
satisfaction, school satisfaction, and federal personnel satisfaction. All metrics except federal 
satisfaction were split into segments, such as percent of loans in repayment that go into default for 
students at public schools. Each segment was given a score with the best ranking servicer receiving 
the points equal to the number of servicers, the second-best given points equal to the number of 
servicers minus one, and so on, with the servicer with the worst performance in the segment 
receiving one point. For each servicer, segment scores in each metric were averaged together to 
create a metric score. For example, a servicer’s scores for the borrower surveys for in school, in 
grace, and in repayment would be averaged together to make the metric score for the borrower 
survey. Metric scores were then multiplied by its given weight and added together. The allocation 
for a servicer was equal to the number of points it had, divided by total points held by all servicers 
(Federal Student Aid, 2009).16 
  
 
16 For example, if there were five servicers, the number of total points would be 75. First, as there are five metrics 
and five servicers, 15 points would be given for each metric (5 for first, 4 for second, etc.). Then, as there are five 
metrics, each with 15 points distributed, the total points given would be 75 (15 points per metric multiplied by 5 
metrics). The servicer’s percentage of allocation of new borrower would then be its points (maximum of 25 and 
minimum of five) divided by 75.  
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Appendix D: CFPB Issue Coding 
After exporting data with the product label student loan, January 2016 through July 2019, and only 
keeping servicers of interest in this paper, we are left with 24,793 complaints. We choose the start 
date of January 2016, as CFPB did not separately track federal student loan servicing, previously 
focusing on private student loan servicing (Delisle and West, 2019). Within the CFPB complaint 
database, complaints are labeled by standardized subissues. Complaints in our data take one of 48 
subissues. In coding issues as by category, we assigned subissues based on the core problem. Table 
D1 lists the issues, category, and their frequency. All includes complaints with a subproduct listing 
of either federal, non-federal, or private student loan servicing, with the right-most column limiting 
frequencies to only complaints with a subproduct of federal student loan servicing. 
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Account Maintenance and Information 
Received bad information about my/your loan^ 
Need information about my/your loan balance/terms^ 
Account information/status incorrect^ 
Their investigation did not fix an error on your report  
Fraudulent loan 
Information belongs to someone else 
Old information reappears or never goes away 
Problem with personal statement of dispute 
Billing dispute for services 
Reporting company used your report improperly 
Personal information incorrect 
Investigation took more than 30 days 
Other problem getting your report or credit score 
Was not notified of investigation status or results  
Information is missing that should be on the report  
Credit inquiries on your report that you don’t recognize 
Public record information inaccurate 
Report provided to employer without your written authorization  
Problem cancelling credit monitoring or identity theft protection services 










































Trouble with how payments are handled^ 
Can’t decrease my/Problem lowering your monthly payments^ 
Can’t get flexible payment options for repaying your loan^ 









Terms and Fees 
Don’t agree with fees charged^ 
Can’t qualify for a loan 
Qualified for a better loan than the one offered^ 
Problem with the interest rate 
Denied loan 













Interaction with Servicer and Marketing 
Problem with customer service^ 
Keep getting calls about my/your loans^ 
Confusing or misleading advertising 
Difficulty submitting a dispute or getting information about a dispute 
over the phone 
Received unwanted marketing or advertising  















Notes: ^ indicates subissue frequency combined with another extremely similar subissue, where issues could be 
combined without losing meaning. For example, one was “Received bad information about my loan” and another 
“Received bad information about your loan,” which we combined into “Received bad information about my/your 
loan.” Subissues had slight changes like the above example over the time period of complaints, January 2016 through 
July 2019.  
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Borrowers making complaints through CFPB are given the option to write a narrative about the 
complaint. Below are examples from chosen subissues to help provide rationale behind our coding. 
 
Examples of “Don’t Agree with fees charged” 
 
I took classes via a method I didn't understand in 2014. It was a vet difficult, online college 
program prepared by XXXX XXXX University. When classes were dropped, loans were not 
rebuked by financial aid and I think this is wrong. I am {$5000.00} in debt and I only passed XXXX 
classes -- I also only saw XXXX classes through. I don't understand why I am not merely paying 
for those XXXX classes and the loans granted for them. What is the reason I have to pay for student 
loans for classes I did not complete? Loan is financed by Great Lakes. I had no understanding of 
loans and no family I could discuss them with but I believe that if I quick the class in time it isn't 
fair that I was still charged for loans that I never saw the light on. 8/23/16 Great Lakes  
 
I applied to XXXX in XX/XX/XXXX, graduated with an XXXX in XX/XX/XXXX and wanted to 
pursue my XXXX in XX/XX/XXXX continuing my knowledge in the same field. Unfortunately, all 
of XXXX got shut down due to fraud and when I tried to continue with my credentials, that I 
supposedly received already from XXXX, the new institution ( XXXX ) told me no one will be 
accepting any transfers or credits from XXXX. I am now responsible for a Federal Student Loan 
through Great Lakes Borrowers and I don't feel I should be responsible to pay back anything due 
to XXXX going bankrupt and making promises they never fulfilled also for wasting my time in 
pursuance of a career that has no credential back up. 3/28/17 Great Lakes 
 
I decided to quit attending XXXX after seeing the teachers not help but actually give the answers 
away for the tests so everyone would pass. Upon seeing this I knew the degree from XXXX would 
be worthless. This would hurt any chance I had of getting a job in the field of study I was in. 
1/19/17 Navient 
 
When I signed up for XXXX XXXX I was under that this was the best career to go into. They did 
not explain that I would end up paying over XXXX. I did not understand the interest on the balance. 
1/19/17 Navient 
 
Examples of “Trouble with how payments are handled” 
 
I have called GSMR multiple times over the last year regarding my loan payments. I have been 
enrolled in autopay for a number of years and noticed in XX/XX/XXXX my payments stopped being 
collected for no apparent reason. I was informed by GSMR that this was because I entered a 
graduate program and the loans were in deferment. I requested that my loans not be placed in 
deferment, and that I wished to continue making payments on my account. I was informed by a 
customer service representative that I would occasionally miss one month, as their process was 
automatic, but there were notes made on my account and the autopay would pick up the following 
month. Whereas I didn’t fully approve of this explanation, I went with it as I didn’t feel like fighting. 
I notice today that apparently they have not pulled a payment since XX/XX/XXXX. I feel this is an 
unethical business practice, as they cancel my autopay, with no notice to me, and continue to rack 
up interest on a loan that I have been attempting to pay. This organization makes it so difficult to 
repay your loan in hopes that they can continue to collect interest from you. 1/12/18 Granite State 
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Nelnet, my loan servicer, has been actively preventing my payments from going through the way I 
want them to. I have had special standing instructions for my auto-debit to apply all extra funds 
to the loan with the highest interest rate, but this is the second time they 've been " misplaced '' 
after my payment goes through. I have no way of viewing these instructions or verifying that they 
're being followed until way after I make my payment without calling Nelnet. Access to the proper 
information is buried way too deeply on the site. They keep using their own way of applying funds 
where they " catch up '' my lower interest loans to where my higher interest one is in my payment 
schedule, then I have to spend about 1-2 hours every single month correcting the problem with 
them. Their website does not show any of this information. 1/23/17 Nelnet 
 
Examples of “Can’t get flexible payment options for repaying your loan” 
 
I obtained about XXXX in student loan debt XX/XX/XXXX. When I graduated from college 
XX/XX/XXXX, I wasn't able to pay back my loan at the minimum payment because of other debt. 
They wouldn't allow me to use an income-based payment plan because that only calculated my 
income and not any of my bills. Not being able to make the payment they always suggested that I 
do a forebearance which continued to accrue interest. When I finally had the opportunity to 
consolidate my loans, the lowest rate was 8.25 %. My debt is now XXXX and I pay 8.25 % interest 
on it. I 'm not allowed to re-consolidate at a lower rate so I 'm stuck with this high interest debt of 
XXXX. I 've been making monthly payments for a few years but I can only pay $ XXXX/month 
because of other income obligations. This doesn't even cover my interest. I will be paying for this 
loan for the rest of my life with no opportunity to re-consolidate at a lower rate and the principal 
payoff increases every month. If I was able to use the income based repayment plan and have it 
factor in my bills vs my income, I probably could have made payments rather than forbearance. 
They made the forbearance option way too easy. 1/21/17 MOHELA  
 
I feel we were mislead with the forbearance. The interest that accrued over the course of 
forbearance is close to {$20000.00} in 5 years. The original loan was {$58000.00}. We did not 
fully understand this process. During this time, we went through a bankruptcy. This is our 
daughter's student loan taken out as a parent loan. We also did not realize she was not on the loan 
at all as the plan was for her to pay her loan. She worked in low income schools as a XXXX and 
was not able to get the loan discounted as it was in our names only. We would have done the 
original loan as a cosigner if we had been offered that option. Our complaint is with the servicer 
both XXXX and Navient. The school attended was XXXX. 2/19/17 Navient 
 
I've had to defer and place my loans in forebearance ever since graduating and thanks to the 
interest rate, I may never pay it down. I’m grateful for the loan but need help getting the balance 
down or possibly lowered interest rates. I was able to get an income based repayment but it expires 
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Appendix E: Data & Estimation of Servicer Semiannual Allocations 
Data 
Data come from Federal Student Aid (FSA) quarterly Servicer Performance and Allocations 
reports. Each quarter, FSA publishes a report within its online Data Center  
(https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/business-info/contracts/loan-servicing/servicer-
performance#Reports%20by%20Quarter) of each servicer’s performance in each metric. For 
repayment, this is the repayment rate during the quarter, by delinquency, within each segment. For 
the borrower and federal personnel surveys, it is the average score. Allocations by servicer as a 
percent of total are also published for Q2 and Q4 each year. Explanations of the performance and 
allocation methodology accompany each quarterly report. Data on number of borrowers by 
servicer, loan status, and quarter also come from the FSA “Data Center” (Federal Student Aid 
2018a), https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/student/portfolio. 
 There is a lack of detail on some aspects in the data. Specifically, although their splitting 
repayment rates into five segments since 2016 has added detail about subpopulations, the data do 
not list what percentage of borrowers for a given servicer falls into each segment. To create a 
weighting scheme, we use other data for Federal Student Aid to estimate weights. First, we find 
the percent of borrowers who have a consolidated or Parent PLUS loan, about 14% across 
repayment rates. Next, we find data showing the number of borrowers who have a direct loan, split 
by graduated or not graduated status and days delinquent. As we do not know the number of 
borrowers by days since left or graduated from school, we split the weight for number of students 
graduated or not-completed school each halfway. For example, about 57.2% of borrowers who 
have paid in the past 90 days and do not have a Consolidated or Parent PLUS are in repayment 
and graduated from school. We thus assigned a weight of about 28.6% (half of 57%) to both 
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segments (2) and (3) within the metric of borrowers paying in the past 90 days. We did this for 
each segment within each metric. We then use this weighted data for analyzing the relationships 
between repayment rates and the two surveys. 
Estimation of Servicer Semiannual Allocations 
To estimate servicer semiannual allocation, we followed the method in Federal Student Aid’s 
(FSA) “Explanation of Allocation and Performance Measure Methodology” document. 
However, while we had the values for each servicer for each quarter of performance by metric 
and segment, some information was not provided, specifically, the number of borrowers in each 
segment, which is factored into weighting performance. As the number of borrowers in each 
segment is used to weight scores, we therefore needed to estimate the number of students in each 
of the five segments (S) within each metric (M). 
Making Segment Weights 
S1 is “Borrowers with at least one Consolidation or Parent PLUS loan.” Using Federal Student 
Aid’s data on “Portfolio by Loan Type,” the percentage of borrowers fitting S1’s criteria has 
consistently been just over 14, and we therefore use the weight of 14.25% percent across all 
metrics, the average from 2014 through 2017.The remaining 85.75% of borrowers are therefore 
in the remaining segments. 
 S2 is “Borrowers with no Consolidation or Parent PLUS loans, separation dates 1,094 
days or less from the last day of the current quarter, and an enrollment status code of G 
(graduated).” S3 is the same except it is “separation dates 1,095 days or greater …” instead.  
 S4 is “Borrowers with no Consolidation or Parent PLUS loans, separation dates 1,094 
days or less from the last day of the current quarter, and without an enrollment status code of G 
(graduated).” S5 is the same except it is “separation dates 1,095 days or greater …” instead.  
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 Another FSA data file, “Direct Loan Portfolio by Delinquency Status and Enrollment” 
shows the number of borrowers who have Direct Loans, are in repayment status, and how many 
borrowers are in each delinquency length (e.g., 91‒180 days). We then put the number of 
borrowers into their respective segment dependent on their status (either S2 and S3 or S4 and S5) 
and delinquency.  
 We then divided the number of borrowers in that segment and metric by the total number 
of borrowers in that metric (except the number of borrowers in S1). We then multiplied that 
percentage by 85.75%, the percentage of borrowers in segments 2, 3, 4, or 5. As we do not know 
how long they have been in their status of graduating from or leaving school, we do not know 
how many students are in S2 versus S3 or S4 versus S5. We therefore divide the number by two 
for each segment. Table E1 below shows the weight used for each of the 15 segments and 
metrics. 
Table E1. Weight for Metric and Segment 
Metric Segment 𝜔𝜔𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗  
1 1 0.1425 
1 2 0.2855 
1 3 0.2855 
1 4 0.1433 
1 5 0.1433 
2 1 0.1425 
2 2 0.1801 
2 3 0.1801 
2 4 0.2487 
2 5 0.2487 
3 1 0.1425 
3 2 0.1639 
3 3 0.1639 
3 4 0.2649 
3 5 0.2649 
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Calculating Allocations 
After creating segment weights, we then followed Federal Student Aid steps in calculating new 
allocations. We first calculated the base score for each segment. 
(1) Calculate Base Score 
𝛷𝛷𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗,𝑅𝑅,𝑠𝑠 = 𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗 − 𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗,𝑅𝑅,𝑠𝑠 + 1, 
where 𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗 is the number of servicers in quarter t, 𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗,𝑅𝑅,𝑠𝑠 is the servicer j’s rank in that time 
period for that metric m for that segment s. For Metric 1, percent current, the servicer with 
highest rate of repayment is ranked 1, whereas for Metrics 2 and 3, percent 91‒270 days 
delinquent and percent 271‒360 days delinquent, the servicer with the lowest rate is ranked 1. 
Doing this for each of the five segments for each of the three repayment metrics creates 15 base 
scores, which will then be weighted. 
(2) Weight Score Based on Number of Borrowers in Each Segment 
𝑊𝑊𝛷𝛷𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗,𝑅𝑅,𝑠𝑠 = 𝜔𝜔𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅 ∗ 𝛷𝛷𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗,𝑅𝑅,𝑠𝑠 ,  
where 𝜔𝜔𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗  refers to the respective weight for each metric’s segments shown in Table E1. FSA 
weights base scores as some segments have more borrowers, so we weight each segment based 
on our estimated number of borrowers in each metric and segment. 
(3) Calculate Score across Two Periods 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃_𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑_𝑊𝑊𝛷𝛷𝑗𝑗 ,𝑗𝑗,𝑅𝑅,𝑠𝑠 =
𝑊𝑊𝛷𝛷𝑗𝑗,𝑅𝑅,𝑠𝑠,𝑗𝑗 +  𝑊𝑊𝛷𝛷𝑗𝑗,𝑅𝑅,𝑠𝑠,𝑗𝑗−1
2  
As FSA allocates new loans to servicers semiannually, but repayment metrics and scores are 
calculated quarterly, FSA averages scores, by metric and segment, with the prior time period. We 
do likewise to create a two-period weighted score for each servicer in each time period, for each 
metric and segment, shown by equation (3).  
(4) Calculate Base Metric Score by Aggregating Segments to Metric 
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𝑃𝑃𝛷𝛷𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗,𝑅𝑅 = ∑ 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃_𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑_𝑊𝑊𝛷𝛷𝑗𝑗 ,𝑗𝑗,𝑅𝑅,𝑠𝑠5𝑠𝑠=1 . 
For each time period and servicer, we then aggregate scores from the segment to the metric level 
to create a preliminary metric score. 
(5) Assign Points based on Metric Score Ranks 
𝛷𝛷𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗,𝑅𝑅 = 𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗 − 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗,𝑅𝑅 + 1. 
FSA then assigns points for servicer ranks in each of the five metrics, similar to (1). For each 
metric, the servicer with the highest 𝑃𝑃𝛷𝛷𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗,𝑅𝑅 receives a Metric_Rank of one, the second highest a 
Metric_Rank of two, and so on for each servicer. 
(6) Weight Final Metric Points by Weighting Factor 
𝑊𝑊𝛷𝛷𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗,𝑅𝑅 = 𝜔𝜔𝑅𝑅 ∗ 𝛷𝛷𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗,𝑅𝑅 . 
We then weight the Metric_Points where weights for each metric are in Table E2 below. 
Table E2. Metric Weights 
Metric 𝜔𝜔𝑅𝑅 
1 - Paid in past 90 Days 30% 
2 – Paid in past 91-270 Days 15% 
3 – Paid in past 271-360 Days 15% 
4 – Borrower Survey 35% 
5 – Federal Survey 5% 
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We then calculate an overall performance score for each servicer and time period by aggregating 
each servicer’s weighted metric points. 
(8) Aggregate Servicer Overall Scores to Determine Total Period Points 
𝛷𝛷𝑗𝑗 = ∑ 𝛷𝛷𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗
𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1 . 
We then calculate how many points were allocated overall in each time period by aggregating 
overall scores for the time period. 
(9) Determine Servicer Allocation by Fraction of Total Period Points 




Last, we find the final estimate of the new allocation percentage for each servicer and time 
period by dividing its overall score by total points for that time period. 
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Appendix F: Brief Federal Student Loan History 
Prior to the federal government’s entry into student loans, students who needed to borrow to 
finance postsecondary education expenses would typically seek funds from private sources, 
including nongovernmental financial institutions, family and friends, or colleges and universities. 
These credit constraints had the potential to lead to an underinvestment in human capital 
(Friedman, 1962). Because the asset financed with a student loan cannot be securitized, there are 
limited recovery options for the lender in the event of debtor default, making it costly for lenders 
to lend to prospective students. As well, since research consistently demonstrates that college 
improves societal welfare beyond private returns to the student (e.g., Avery and Turner, 2012; 
Card, 1999; Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011; Moretti, 2004), high costs of borrowing will lead 
individuals to attend college at a lower rate than is socially optimal.  
The largest federal student loan program, now called Stafford Loans after U.S. Senator 
Robert T. Stafford, started in 1965 with the passage of the Higher Education Act. Institutional 
eligibility to disburse student loans to their students depends on meeting a series of requirements 
related to fiscal health, accreditation, and other policies (see Darolia, 2013. for a discussion of 
these eligibility policies). Until the early 1990s, private lenders under the Stafford program used 
their own capital to make student loans to students and their parents and were responsible for 
collection and servicing. The federal government set the rate of the loans, which were typically 
below what one would expect to be able to obtain in the private market and set other terms 
regarding eligibility requirements, borrowing limits, and repayment options. These Federal Family 
Education Loan (FFEL) program loans were subsidized and guaranteed by the federal government, 
such that private lenders were insured against default (i.e., the lender was reimbursed if the debtor 
defaulted). 
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In 1994, the government started the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program (Direct 
Loans), where the government uses federal funds from the U.S. Department of the Treasury to 
directly lend to students and their families. While the U.S. Treasury provides the funds, the U.S. 
Department of Education hires private contractors to service and collect the loans. Many of the 
Direct Loan servicers also contract with private lenders to service loans under the FFEL program. 
Both FFEL program loans and Direct Loans were available to students and their families through 
2010, and terms across programs were nearly identical to the borrower.17 However, new loans 
were discontinued under the FFEL program in 2010 with the passage of the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act, such that all new Stafford loans since 2010 are funded directly by 
the government and serviced by private contractors. Prior to its elimination, about 80% of the 
federal outstanding student loan debt was from the FFEL program, with most of the remainder 
coming from the Direct Loan program.18 By 2018, that ratio flipped, with Direct Loans comprising 




17 There were small differences in fees: Under both programs, students were charged a 1 percent origination fee, but 
under direct loans, debtors could get a refund of a portion of their origination fee if they repaid on time. There were 
also some interest rate differences in some years on loans made to parents of undergraduate students (PLUS loans; 
these loans were also available to graduate students who exceeded the borrowing limit on Stafford loans).  
18 About 1 percent of outstanding loan debt is from the recently retired Perkins Loans program. Perkins Loans were 
first authorized in 1958 under the National Defense Education Act. Perkins Loan funds are distributed directly to 
colleges and universities, who allocate funds to their students based on need.  
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Source: National Student Loan Data System (NSLDS), as reported by the U.S. Department of Education.  
 
